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Teaching Rational Decision Making: 
A Commentary on Mark Battersby’s  
“Practical Rationality:  
Critical Questions for Rational Decision Making” 
 
SHELDON WEIN 
Department of Philosophy 






I agree with Mark Battersby’s main point that critical thinking courses should be thought of “as 
instruction in applied rationality”, and I find helpful his division of applied rationality into 
“epistemic rationality (what to believe) and practical rationality (what to do), [and] evaluative 
rationality (what to value, what ends to pursue)”. And he is certainly correct in thinking that, 
lamentably, most critical thinking courses devote a disproportionate amount of time and effort to 
epistemic rationality and not enough to either practical rationality or evaluative rationality. 
(When I teach critical thinking, I devote close to half the time to helping students think critically 
about what to do and only slightly over half to what to believe. But since hearing philosophers 
agree with each other is, well, boring, I will begin with a fundamental disagreement. I will then 
argue that, for Mark’s purposes, this disagreement isn’t as important as he seems to think it is. 
Thus, my commentary really consists of saying: He is wrong about something important. But 
given that he doesn’t accurately characterize the position of those who are right about this 
important matter, the practical difference his fundamental error makes is not as great as he 
thinks. Finally, I will suggest that, for Mark’s ultimate practical purposes, it does not matter 
which of us is right about the fundamental philosophic disagreement we have. Along the way I 
will mention (briefly, to avoid being boring) many things he is right about. 
 
2. Humean passions  
I am a Humean. Mark is not. Mark thinks, perhaps correctly, that Humeans tend to be committed 
to Rational Choice Theory (RCT). Why he thinks this is perfectly understandable. One of 
Hume’s most famous claims (perhaps his most famous claim) is that “Reason is, and ought only 
to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey 
them” (Treatise, Bk III, Part 3, Section 3). From this we get a picture of human motivation. We 
have certain desires (passions). Reason tells us how to satisfy those desires. It does not evaluate 
them. End of story. On this interpretation there is never any role for reason in evaluating a 
desire—only a role in how to satisfy that desire. It could never, for instance, tell one to rid 
oneself of a passion. 
 But this is an uncharitable interpretation of Hume (and of most Humeans). I will advance 
three arguments that, even for Hume, reason does sometimes have a role in helping us select 
desires. The first two are uncontentious, the last is less so. 
 Suppose David has two desires: to go drinking with his friends tonight and to get a lot of 
work done tomorrow. Reason might well tell him that satisfying both desires it not possible. He 
needs to decide which passion is stronger and then use reason to help him rid himself of the other 
desire. David decides that, on balance, he would rather get work done tomorrow, so he turns his 
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reason to the task of undermining his desire to spend the evening drinking with friends. Perhaps 
reason tells him that reading history is almost as pleasant a way to spend the evening as drinking 
is and that doing that would in no way impair his ability to satisfy his desire to be productive 
tomorrow. Using reason in this way—even though it tells one to eliminate or weaken a certain 
passion in order to better satisfy another passion—maintains its Humean status as a slave of the 
passions. 
 Let us continue with the case above. David wants to be productive tomorrow not for its 
own sake but (let us suppose) because he believes that, by being productive, he will eventually 
gain fame. And he wants fame for its own sake. He intrinsically values fame and instrumentally 
values doing philosophy as a means of attaining fame. Presumably he values drinking with his 
friends instrumentally as a means of gaining happiness or pleasure, which he values intrinsically. 
His competing values (for working tomorrow and for drinking tonight) are both instrumental 
values. Of course, David might value working on philosophic problems or drinking with friends 
for their own sake. But notice that if he values each of them instrumentally, there has to be 
something he values them for intrinsically. It need not be the very next thing he values. He might 
value working as a means to solving some philosophic problem, and solving some philosophic 
problem as a means to getting published, and getting published as a means to becoming famous 
(which he values for its own sake). Even David will agree with Aristotle that a life that is 
devoted entirely to pursuing things that are valued only instrumentally is vain and futile. Reason 
tells us that among one’s values there must be things that are intrinsically valued, and that any 
instrumental value worth having must be connected to something intrinsically valued. 
 On the Humean view, one can—without being charged with irrationality—value anything. 
One can intrinsically value things which (to the rest of us) seem to have no intrinsic value and 
sometimes no value at all (or even negative value). This is what makes the Humean view seem 
absurd to many people. Suppose Sheldon has a passion for annoying Mark. This is not something 
he seeks in order to accomplish something else he values; he just values annoying Mark for the 
sake of annoying Mark. Given Hume’s famous dictum, it seems that reason’s only role is to tell 
Sheldon how to best go about annoying Mark. (Will getting his commentary to Mark early or 
late be more annoying to Mark?) But of course, reason (even Humean reason) may well tell 
Sheldon a bit more. It might, for instance, point out to him that satisfying his passion for 
annoying Mark is going to frustrate his desire not to be seen to be a jerk. And, if the latter 
passion is stronger, then Humean reason will tell Sheldon to do what he can to squelch his 
annoy-Mark desire. But if Sheldon has no don’t-be-seen-as-a-jerk desires, then reason’s sole role 
is to tell him how annoy Mark. Yet this last point seems wrong to many—indeed most—people. 
  Let me suggest that even on a Humean account of reason, reason can tell us that some 
things—even if just very general things—about what it is appropriate to value for its own sake. 
There are certain very general facts about humans: that we are conscious and tend to prefer 
pleasure to pain, that we (usually) prefer being happy to sad, that we are social animals who are 
highly dependent on others for our well-being (a feature Hume thought grounded our sense of 
justice), that fulfillment often comes from succeeding at tasks we take to be worthy and difficult, 
that organizing one’s life so that meeting the demands of morality is not extremely burdensome, 
and that we are all (or almost all) moderately altruistic—and these very general features suggest 
that some passions one might be unfortunate enough to have just by nature should be starved 
rather than cultivated.1 So, despite the point made in the previous paragraph, there is a weak role 
for Humean reason to play in regulating our passions. 
 
1 In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart defends the separability thesis—the thesis that law and morality are 
conceptually distinct so that even highly immoral rules might nevertheless be properly seen as laws within a legal 
system. However, he notes that, given certain very general features of the human condition—that we are vulnerable 
to being harmed by others, that we are approximately equal in strength and ability, that we have limited altruism and 
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3. Hume and Rational Choice Theory (RCT) 
  
It is often thought that Humeans must be committed to rational choice theory. There is a sense in 
which this is true, but not in the way that some critics standardly take it to be so. I agree with 
Mark’s important points (taken from Simon’s work). I will just add—and I think this point is 
implicit in Mark’s arguments—that while RTC recommends that one consult the maximize 
expected utility principle in situations of uncertainty, it is important to remember that it does not 
always (indeed it often does not) maximize expected utility to consult the maximize expected 
utility principle when deciding what to do. There are several reasons for this. One is that the 
costs of using the principle every time one is making a choice may be too great. (As Mark 
correctly points out, the use of a checklist often offers great benefits. And this is something of 
which any Humean would want to take advantage. For these reasons, a Humean should find the 
procedures outlined in the box Mark has included as a helpful guide when making important 
decisions.2) Another is that, as with the well-known paradox of happiness, seeking to maximize 
expected utility is often a bad way to gain much utility.3 And, as Mark points out, trying to 
maximize utility may well serve to enhance our natural tendencies toward self-bias.4 
Furthermore, the maximize expected utility principle (as the literature on Newcomb’s Problem 
and on the Prisoner’s Dilemma shows) is poorly suited when making decisions that arise in game 
theory. Any good Humean will want to avail themselves of the various principles of choice that 
game theorists have shown work well in the wide variety of situations where one is interacting 
socially.  
 
4. Critical Thinking Textbooks and Rationalists vs Humeans 
 
Most critical thinking textbooks devote most or all of their space to discussing matters relevant 
to epistemic rationality. (Of course, there is substantial disagreement about just what proportion 
of the available space should be devoted to the various relevant topics. Is it worthwhile to 
include truth tables? Formal derivations? Argument mapping? Fallacies? And so forth.) Mark 
and I agree that, in addition to these topics, a good deal of space should be devoted to practical 
rationality and evaluative rationality. Of course, we differ about the ultimate philosophic basis 
for evaluative rationality. But for purposes of a textbook this does not matter. Here is my 
argument. 
 Suppose you are writing a critical thinking textbook. You decide to devote some space to 
truth tables. You likely have a favoured account of the nature of truth. But you know that, among 
 
limited resources available, and that we suffer from limited understanding and strength of will—there are certain 
things that are almost inevitably going to be part of the content of any legal system and any morality that has any 
hope of lasting for very long. My suggestion here regarding the passions an individual is likely to need, should they 
hope to have a successful life, is similar to Hart’s argument about what it takes for a legal system to do well. 
2 It might seem that the issues raised under item 2 in both parts of Mark’s box would be a problem for a Humean. 
But this is not so. If the Humean account of reason is correct, our moral duties and obligations are among the most 
highly valued ends (or restrictions on means to ends, in some cases) that people have. Of course, it seems odd to say 
these are just parts of their preference set, as though one’s commitment to treating others with respect rather than not 
were just like one’s preference for chocolate ice cream over vanilla ice cream.  
3 The classic discussion of this problem is found in Joseph Butler’s Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel 
and in Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. Bertrand Russell’s discussion is in The Conquest of Happiness. 
4 For a good discussion, see Ballantyne, N. (2015), Debunking biased thinkers (including ourselves). Journal of the 
American Philosophical Association. 1, pp 141-162. 
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the instructors using your text, there will be some who are disquotationalists about truth, some 
who will be coherence theorists, some who are correspondence theorists, and others. Your text 
has to talk about truth and falsity in a way that is neutral between competing conceptions of the 
concept of truth. (Even better, it should present this in a way that will get students to consider 
thinking about these matters and take another philosophy course in epistemology or 
metaphysics.) The same goes for practical rationality. Some of the instructors will share Mark’s 
views, some mine, most some other view about the role and limits of reason in determining what 
to do and what one should do. The textbook has to be written in such a way that instructors can 
comfortably teach from it in a way that is compatible with their own deeper account of the role 
of reason.  
 The important point—on which I am in complete agreement with Mark—is that critical 
thinking courses should not just help students develop skills in adopting beliefs that are 
appropriate to the evidence they have, but should also help them make wise decisions. This latter 
task that has for too long been neglected. 
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